Who Should Decide? Beyond the Democratic Boundary Problem with Laura Valentini | DEMOS21

Who should have a say in a given decision for it to count as democratic? This is the question with which the so-called democratic boundary problem is concerned. Two main “solutions” have emerged in the literature: the all-affected principle (AAP) and the all-subjected principle (ASP). My aim in this paper is to question the presuppositions underpinning the boundary-problem debate. Scholars have proceeded by taking democracy for granted, treating it as an ultimate value. Consequently, the best solution to the boundary problem has been framed as the one that most loyally reflects the value of democracy. But it is not at all obvious that democracy is best conceptualised as an ultimate value. Arguably, democracy marks out a family of decision-making systems that are themselves justified by appeal to how they reflect and promote important values in particular circumstances. The values in question range from equality and self-determination, to peace, security, and respect for fundamental rights. In other words, what we call “democracy” is itself one of several possible solutions to the boundary problem (i.e., the problem of who should take part in a given decision): a solution that is contingently justified by appeal to a variety of different values. This means that neither the AAP nor the ASP can provide one-size-fits-all solutions to the problem.